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Introduction
Until the introduction of the Currency Board Arrangement, that took place in 1997, the banking system in Bulgaria had been gradually decapitalized (Figure 1 The goal was to work out all possible and necessary assessments in parallel with their influences, which were considered both as independent management policies with their effects and as a complex scheme. A number of econometric dependencies revealed unsatisfactory estimates from the point of view of economic logic, and these were not addressed in this work. The current article does not analyze the reasons for the unsatisfactory econometric estimates, especially under consideration of banking interactions, which were discussed by other authors (Kazi & Leonard, 2011) . Instead, the emphasis is placed on establishing the interactions (in principle) of the relationship management in terms of outcomes and explanations. The analysis is aimed at assessing the financial and banking sustainability in the context of the overall economic environment.
The article is organized as follows: The major elements of the commercial banking policies are analyzed in the first five parts, together with reflection on the regulatory measures applied. The next part contains an attempt at systematizing the policy lessons, and the final part presents the conclusions and synthesis.
Resource provision and lending policies
Immediately following the 1996-1997, years of crisis, the CBs were exceptionally careful and restrained in formulating their lending policies. Confidence between lenders and debtors was at a notably low level.
Because the CBs were reluctant to lend, their financial resources were not used to the fullest. During this period, the CBs preferred to export their resources and retain them as deposits with first-class foreign CBs (Figure 2) . Therefore, only a quarter of the CBs' assets were realized as loans (Figure 4) . Lending grew over time, however, and by 2005, it accounted for approxmately 60% of assets. Koetter & Wedow (2010) proved that under the given circumstances, expanding the amount of bank credit has no significant effect on growth and that the quality of banking is more important. During the same year, the BNB undertook selected regulatory measures to cool the rate of lending: regulations were aimed at the operation of thecommercial banks' reserves held with the BNB. The lending market reacted positively to the regulatory measures, and the share of the loans in the CBs' assets fell gradually to near 52%.
This share was close to the average for the EU member the EU is a typical feature of the period under consideration and has been noted in specialist literature (Krugman, 2008; Wilczyński, 2011 (BNB, 2011) .
Such an uncalculated and unwise emphasis on lending provided by the CBs no doubt incurred risks warranted great attention. The diversification of the CBs' portfolio with a view toward mastering the credit risk receded in the background in the face of the possibility for profit accumulation. The lending race was in full swing.
After 2008, the problem that the resident CBs faced was one of how to contain the pressure for impairment of the loans that had been issued. The CBs' assets continued to rise significantly due to inertia rather than as the outcome of an awareness of a positive return.
At this point, the growth of deposits in the banking sector (such growth actually occurred; for 2009-2011, deposits with the CBs grew by nearly BGN 6 billion, given that non-residents' deposits fell by BGN 5.7 billion) was enabled by the higher level of domestic savings. Consequently, a process of gradual contraction of lending activities began. The non-resident depositors began to withdraw, which might be attributed to the feeling of insecurity in domestic macroeconomic management rather than international conjuncture.
The corporate tax in Bulgaria is the lowest in the EU, and investors are charged higher tax rates in any other European country. Nevertheless, investments grew gradually, but the growth rate continued to shrink.
This development was assisted by the resident CBs as well, which began to export financial resources more actively to retain them with the foreign CBs.
Foreign capital is particularly sensitive to the elements of domestic macroeconomic management. An additional funding risk arose from the origin of this capital, especially from difficulties in the banking systems of the home countries. This was the situation in Bulgaria, especially due to the predominance of the than three years ago). Such a sectoral lending structure was typical of the EU and not only of the EU. In fact, the mania for investing in real estate, renting and business activities seemed universal (DG Enterprise and Industry, 2012; European Commission, 2011) . The prevailing public opinion was that real estate prices would never collapse (Roubini & Mihm, 2010) . This sector composition of credits cannot be deemed sustainable or promising for the future. were officially effected at artificially low prices (roughly ten times lower than the real price paid), which encouraged profiteering in real estate. Control of licenses for new construction was a formality that enabled accelerated investment on a large scale, and construction sites were quickly designed without care for the future, using easy money. All these activities became possible because the various institutions functioned poorly.
In parallel with this process, the formal grounds for charges of illegal (criminal) deeds were eliminated because the huge amount of real estate acquired was officially accounted at unnaturally low prices. For experienced defenders of the law, it is not difficult to find a seemingly satisfactory explanation of how large buildings were acquired at artificially lower official prices and thus escape legal prosecution.
The government is the authority that should install order in this type of speculation. If the government had not allowed cheating in the sales and trading prices of real estate, then the incentives for profiteering in this field would have been eliminated. Roubini & Mihm (2010) Immediately afterwards, the CBs would withdraw up to a fourth ormore from the MRR. By 2012, this amplitude had clearly shrunk but has remained quite large.
Sobering
A logical explanation for the process observed is that the CBs need liquidity, and thus they resort to using their own reserves maintained with the BNB. Third, we examine the composition of the CBs' assets.
In Figure 4 , we can trace the change in the share of the CBs' loans via their assets (the data are given for the entire banking system). This information was presented in the official analytical materials of the BNB (BNB, 2012) . By the end of 2011, the CBs' loans and advances constituted almost four-fifths (78.6%) of the CBs' as- (not with the CBs), which was ripe for realization.
In the primary GS market for the period under consideration, the non-banking institutions, i.e. insurance companies, pension funds, non-banking financial in- stitutions, companies and individuals, became much more active (Table 3) . For the sake of thoroughness, we should add foreign investors as holders as well, but their participation was limited to one percent of the overall quantity of GS issued on the internal money market). These products were legal entities that accumulated free financial resources and were searching for opportunities for investment with a view towards rational management of the money funds and provision for a return. The preferences included to investing in GS because these products enjoyed higher security and a much longer maturity, which was of considerable importance as well. The one-year GS, issued in 2010, accounted for a tenth of the overall issue of GS, and more than half had a 10-year maturity. At the same time, the predominant promotion of CBs was for deposits of 3-6 month maturity, which obviously differed from what investors sought.
In addition, the cross-border flow of financial resources from residents included in the financial account of the balance of payments (Table 4) was also predominantly sourced from non-banking investors.
The information quoted implies that the various institutional funds in the country enjoyed liquidity that remained underused. Simultaneously, the CBs showed signs of liquidity difficulties. The two sides did not meet, mostly due to structural imbalances. Institutional investors were interested in long-term lucrative investments, whereas the CBs would have rather attracted short-term funds with the expectation of lowering their interest rates costs and receiving improved return on the loans made. 
Currency hedging
The CBs adopt a certain strategy in determining the foreign exchange composition of their own assets and liabilities as a type of anti-crisis safety measure.
The CBs management is able to manage the currency composition of its assets and liabilities in accordance with its own estimates, expectations and preferences.
The management of currency composition is carried out by pursuing a specific interest rate policy for each individual currency component. Table 5 illustrates the currency composition of the funds attracted by the CBs (by the end of the year), and Table 6 displays the currency composition of the loans granted from the resident CBs in the country. (In Table 6 , the sum by years is less than 100% because there is one additional component that is not presented, namely "Impairment"). Table 5 shows that a shift in the CBs' behavior was The changes in the currency composition of the loans followed a strict logic of contraction of the BGLloan share at the expense of the EUR-loan share. There are no chance phenomena with bankers; as a rule, their behaviors are well-thought out and calculated. Therefore, the question that remains is why did the model of banking behavior change?
The party that gains under a substantial depreciation (devaluation, crisis) of the local currency is the borrower, and the party that loses is the lender. If the local currency (the Bulgarian lev) crashed, the bankers who had granted BGL-loans would have lost. As a consequence, the depositors that maintained BGN deposits would have also lost.
The process described is highly inertial (structural sta- 
Income and Expenses Composition
The crisis of 2008 revealed many problems connected with the assessment and adoption of various types of risks in commercial banking. One of these problems is the way in which the remuneration of employees in the banking sector was worked out (Attali, 2008) . It is logical for remunerations to follow the dynamics of the final financial results from the banking operations, but global experience has shown that this is not always so, especially with CBs of dubious success. After four years the normalization sought in the income statement structures of the banking system had drifted substantiually. The structure of Figure 12 would have been much more unfavorable for the CBs, if the old criteria for classification of risk exposure in the individual risk groups of "watch exposures", "nonperforming exposures" and "loss" had been maintained (had they not been extended to twice as long in time instead). A hidden revolving door of bad debts was observed (which statistics are unable to capture) in the hope that borrowers would manage to recover their business profitability in time. The CBs did not demonstrate a desire to begin cashing the collateral pledged.
Obviously, there were no acceptable conditions for that outcome. 
Policy lessons
There is an opinion in certain professional economic circles that the financial and economic crisis of 2007-2008 arose because of excessive faith in the rationality of the market and that of the participants in the markets (Attali, 2008; Stiglitz, 2010b) . Regulations shrank steadily to allow for the free operation of market initiative and this initiative managed to create and spin a broad web of speculative threads, which were wound round and sucked out the economic forces -in the interest of the "irrational" market masters. These actions had their own redistribution effects, which went beyond the direct financial and economic operations. Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl sustainability of the banking system, quite often with consequences that can be difficult to foresee.
Just prior to Bulgaria's accession to the EU and during the first years of its membership, the inflow of foreign capital in the country recorded a considerable increase. The country adjusted exceedingly quickly to this capital meat-dish, and it appeared as if the horn of plenty would never be exhausted. Sobering trends, together with sharp contraction of the financial inflows have had a painful impact on financial and economic development. It is true that the financial crisis reflected most rapidly and significantly on the cross-border movement of capital, but it is also true that money does not shy away from an opportunity described by foresight, transparency, safety and profit.
It is indicative that according to Transparency International, Bulgaria has firmly held the position of the most corrupt country in the EU, and moreover, this situation has continued to worsen (Minassian, 2011) .
At its essence, corruption is a political not an economic problem, i.e., it exists because the political class cannot (or does not want to) eradicate it. The black market has not been cornered and also has been steadily as- and the unfavorable consequences will be felt dreadfully in the near future. For the sake of balancing the government budget, the government let itself delay the settlement of certain overdue large-scale obligations to sub-contractors of government orders, which in turn created prerequisites for a chain accumulation of intercompany obligations and caused tension at a macroeconomic level (Sariyski, 2008; Taseva, 2012) .
Central bankers claim that the Bulgarian taxpayer has not spent money to save the Bulgarian CBs, but this is a surface observation. The highly restricted lending due to the excessively high interest rates is connected with the consistent and tangible shrinking of all investment activities in the country, which sounds ominous in the long run given the exceptional technological backwardness of the Bulgarian economy.
In addition, the highly restricted lending forced economic players at the microeconomic level to activate commercial lending, which is a type of time bomb. Additionally, it is not possible to speak of domestic financial sustainability when residents prefer to export their resources abroad.
What determines the health of an economy is the availability of economic sustainability, and the latter in turn determines social and economic prosperity.
If there is no economic sustainability, everything else (including the so-called sustainability of government finances) is merely rhetorics.
Conclusion
The banking system is a component of the financial and economic institutional structure of society, which is of crucial importance for the normal development of economic processes. Formally, the responsibility for keeping the banking system sustainable lies with the central bank, but as a matter of fact, the banking system becomes the meeting point for almost all elements of macroeconomic management. An adequate assessment of the banking system situation and its regulation presumes taking a view that is higher than banking coordinates, from the position of the national (and the supranational) economy. The sustainability of the banking system is functionally linked to and correlates with the sustainability of economic development. Problems in the banking system might arise from inadequate regulatory measures undertaken by the central bank, but in a prevailing number of cases, they are the outcome of deficiencies in macroeconomic management as a whole.
The soundness of the banking system is linked to the value of transaction costs in the economy.
The financial and economic crisis that Bulgaria has experienced is the outcome of the domestic macroeconomic management of poor quality. Havrylchyk & Bulgarian banking: looking for sustainability Jurzyk (2011) found that direct evidence did not exist for the transfer of negative financial impacts from the parent bank to its subsidiary banks from Central and Eastern Europe, and Acharya &-Schnabl (2010) came to the conclusion that reducing global imbalances was not a panacea for preventing banking crises under the conditions of inefficient regulation. Investment banking was not developed in Bulgaria, and it cannot be blamed for the crisis. Even the shrinking external demand cannot be named as an exogenous reason for the difficulties that the country has experienced. In 2011, for example, the export of goods and services exceeded its pre-crisis level of 2008 by a quarter, whereas the imports of goods and services were almost a tenth lower, i.e., there are grounds to claim that in the critical situation, Bulgaria caused difficulties for its trade partners rather than the opposite.
However, the globalization of developments, and of economic thinking most of all, reflects on the way in which domestic economic processes take place, and their manifestations follow the usual process of "contamination" (Baur, 2012; Ismailescu & Kazemi, 2011; Wilczyński, 2011) . It is a fact that the sharp withdrawal Financial and banking sustainability is an element of overall economic sustainability, which results primarily from endogenous management policies. Economic history has persistently confirmed that in the end "nothing is really exogenous" (Ray, 2004) . The explanation of the financial and economic processes observed and the search for sustainability cannot take place except within the context of an integrated theory of finance and macroeconomics (Mehrling, 2004) .
